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Cross-country evidence suggests that during recent years a large fraction of develop-
ing countries seem to began to overcome fear of 
oating, i.e., a lower relative volatility
of exchange rates to monetary policy instruments. To explain this trend, we build a
model that describes the behavior of Central Banks in developing countries under un-
certainty and fear of misspecication about the eects of exchange rate depreciations.
The Central Bank is uncertain about two sub-models which dier in that exchange rate
depreciations can cause output either to expand (textbook eect) or contract (balance
sheet eect). Optimal policy within the second sub-model is consistent with fear of

oating. A feature of fear of 
oating is that, by preventing sizeable exchange rate
swings, Central Banks could loose valuable information useful to distinguish among
models.
We describe how the Central Bank's the evolution of the prior depends on the
optimal policy and viceversa. We conclude that the trend towards less fear of 
oating
may not be explained by Bayesian or robust policies because it would have been too
quick to explain the data. However, if there was a parameter change aecting many
countries during the early 2000's, the model generates the observed pattern.
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11 Introduction
Cross-country evidence suggests that in recent years, a large number of developing countries
seem to moved towards more 
exible exchange rates. Central Bankers in these economies
often think of exchange rates1 as having two potential eects that work on opposite direc-
tions. On the one hand, high unexpected depreciations might be benecial to agents that
generate some fraction of their income in foreign currency, (e.g., the exporting sector or
agents holding dollar-denominated assets.). Under nominal rigidities, a sudden shift in the
value of the nominal exchange rate translates to a sudden shift in the real exchange rate
and therefore produces benecial wealth and competitiveness eects. This is a standard
economics textbook eect2.
On the other hand, the balance sheet eect is a harmful after-eect that might result from
high unexpected exchange rate depreciations if it induces imbalances in the asset-liability
positions of economic agents. In underdeveloped nancial markets, it is likely that rms
have low coverage and the balance sheet eect may have an aggregate eect. This may occur
when a large fraction of agents hold assets denominated in domestic currency while holding
liabilities denominated in US Dollars. Without insurance to cover them from these losses,
exposed rms might face a credit crunch that leads to an aggregate downturn. Theoretical
and empirical work to date has formalized this ideas and has documented evidence on the
balance sheet eect3.
In this paper, we ask if learning about either eect could explain the trend towards more

exible exchange rates. We abstract from the main mechanisms driving either model. We
characterize the problem of a Central Bank that has uncertainty over a single parameter
that encompasses both eects. Both sub-models are used to guide policy but each of them
delivers opposite eects from unexpected exchange rate movements. In this environment,
policy makers fear missing the true model because outcomes in terms of the data generating
process might render high losses compared.
We rst study a Bayesian Central Bank in which acts in the spirit of Brainard (1967).
Policy makers react according prior beliefs about either model and update them through
Bayes rule. We then explain how this policy and its learning properties are altered when the
Central Bank behaves according to a policy consistent with fear of misspecication. That is,
we analyze the behavior of a Central Bank that behaves optimally according to multiplier
1We dene the exchange rate as the domestic currency price of the US Dollar.
2See for example Clarida et al. (2001) and Gali and Monacelli (2005) for versions of open economy
models with nominal rigidities in which the textbook eect is present.
3See Aghion et al. (2000), Aghion et al. (2001), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001), Krugman (1999),
C espedes et.al (2002), Chang and Velasco (2004), Schneider and Tornell (2004) and Frankel (2005) for
theoretical work. See Hausmann et al. (2001) and Calvo and Reinhart (2002) for empirical evidence.
2preferences as described in Hansen and Sargent (2006) and Hansen and Sargent (2007b).
The tested hypothesis of this paper is that Central Banks around the world put a strong
prior during the early nineties and that it took them more than a decade to learn that they
where wrong. In the context of the model, slow learning could have been caused by a fear
of 
oating policy: do to initial uncertainty, no important exchange rates swings are allowed
while this swings enable a quick detection of the true structure. Hence, fear of 
oating
policies may have induced slow model learning which further sustained the fear of 
oating
policy. In this context, these economies would have moved towards more 
exible exchange
rates slowly.
In spite of being a reasonable explanation, this potential trap is inconsistent with the
model. When we calibrate the model to reasonable parameters we found that learning is
expected to occur in about ve years for both Bayesian and robust policies. This is a faster
pace than what we found in cross-country data. On the other hand, the pattern could be
explained if there was a parameter change from the balance-sheet model to the textbook
model common to many developing during the early 2000's. This reconciliation suggests
that perhaps, there was an international trend towards less exchange rate exposure of these
economies following the nancial crisis of the 1990's.
The nature of the problem we present here is closely related to other recent works that
studies the behavior of Central Banks under model uncertainty. This paper follows the work
by Wieland (2000a), Wieland (2000b), Ellison (2006), Cogley et al. (2007), Ellison,
Sarno and Vilmunen (2007) and Cogley et al. (2008). Most of these papers focused on
uncertainty about the sacrice ratio implied by the Phillips curve and the benets of policy
experimentation in closed economies. Among these papers, Ellison, Sarno and Vilmunen
(2007) is the closest to ours. That paper studies uncertainty about the exchange rate in a
two-country setup in which devaluations have eects through the relative price of imports to
exports. Our paper diers from theirs not only by the nature of uncertainty but also because
we pay special attention to the pace at which the Central Bank under Bayesian and robust
policies learn under a model close to the ones used by Central Banks.
The title is suggestive: this paper tries to explain learning under fear of 
oating and fear
of misspecication. For these purpose, we proceed as follows: In the following section we
describe how the symptoms of systematic fear of 
oating across countries have been weaker
during the last 4 years. In section 2 we introduce a benchmark small open economy model
and in section 3 we present an analytical solution to the optimal Bayesian Central Bank
policy under passive learning. In section 4 we explain how multiplier preferences alter this
policy and how Robust policies are equivalent to Bayesian policy with a distorted prior. In
section 5 we discuss the learning properties of these Central Bank policies and time varying
3parameters. We conclude in section 6.
1.1 Evidence on Learning under Fear
Hausmann et al. (2001) and Calvo and Reinhart (2002) describe exchange rate interven-
tions in dierent countries. Their nding suggests that during the nineties decades, many
developing countries had lower relative variance of the exchange rate depreciations over the
interest rates than developed economies. These studies suggest that countries that shared
this feature were countries in which the Central Banks intervened often. The consensus is
that developed countries suered from a fear of 
oating phenomenon which was rationalized
by balance sheet eects.
What if Central Banks where not sure about the presence of the balance sheet eect?
Would they be able to learn over time? To answer these questions, we constructed two
graphs based the statistic suggested by Hausmann et al. (2001) (hereafter HPS-statistic).
Figure 1 compares the relative volatility of exchange rate depreciations and interest rates for
40 countries4. The HPS-statistic re
ects the degree of intervention in exchange rate markets
using nominal interest rates. A low statistic shows high intervention. For a Bayesian Central
Bank, relatively low HPS-statistics are consistent with putting a strong prior to the balance
sheet model independent of the structure.
The sample of countries is restricted to a sample of economies for which the statistic is
at most 6. There are three panels in the gure. Panel (a) is a cross country scatter plot of
the statistic for 2 dierent periods: the x-axis shows the average statistic the period 1994-
1998 and the y-axis for 1999-2004. The solid line is a 45-degree line. Countries close to the
45-degree line had a stable HPS-statistic over both periods. The closer the points to this
line the more stable were the policies. Panel (a) is consistent with Hausmann et al. (2001)
and Calvo and Reinhart (2002) in that the ranking of exchange rate interventions remained
constant through time: countries like Australia, Canada or Japan still intervene less than
Peru, Ukraine or Uruguay.
Panel (b) is the same as Panel (a) for the 1999-2004 sample against the 2005-2008 sample.
Panel (c) depicts with arrows the change in each country's position from panel (a) to panel
(b). Panel (c) shows an international trend: a movement out of the 45-degree line. Note
that the majority of developing countries in the beginning sample are clustered around
the 45-degree line in panel (a). This suggests that during the 1990's developing countries
4The data was obtained from the International Financial Statistics provided by the International Mone-
tary Fund. The panel includes 40 countries. Exchange rates correspond to the money markets. The interest
rates are the Central Bank's discount rate when available which are replaced by the inter-bank rate when
the gure is not available. The data covers the months between January 1994 and December 2008 as the
broadest range. The author provides the data set in his webpage
4Figure 1: Cross Country HPS-statistic: The gure plots the HPS-statistic for countries with
a low statistic (high intervention) for dierent sample periods. Panel (a) plots the statistic
computed for 1994-1998 (x-axis) against 1999-2003 (y-axis). Panel (b) plots the statistic
computed for 1999-2003 (x-axis) against 2004-2008 (y-axis). Panel (c) shows the change
from panel (a) to panel (b). The solid line depicts the 45-degree line. Countries close to the
line had a stable statistic.
constantly intervened in exchange rate markets although across countries the implied statistic
was dierent. Surprisingly, the pattern is not repeated in the center panel. The bulk of
developing countries in the sample jumped to a higher statistic revealing a trend towards
more 
exible regimes. That is, there is evidence that most of the countries in the sample
show a change from a remaining with a low statistic for the rst 2 sub-samples and suddenly
began to allow more volatility in the exchange rate during the last 4 years.
This shows an international trend towards more 
exible exchange rates. It is plausible
to think more of a change in policy rather than having the data driven by common shocks
since the sample periods are long, of about 50 months on average per period. On the other
hand, when the sample is restricted to the group of least intervention, the pattern is lost,
suggesting that the pattern is only constant among countries suering fear of 
oating at the
beggining5.
To check if the evidence is robust to a common took trends out of the data. Detrending
would reduce any articial increase in the variance of exchange rates by changes on the mean.
Figure 2 mimics Figure 1 for HP-ltered data. The overall picture is that the evidence is
5In fact, the 1990's were a period in which exchange rate interventions by Central Banks were constantly
discussed by policy makers and researchers. See for example: Chang and Velasco (2000), Ize and Levy-Yeyati
(2003), Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003), Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003), Chang and Velasco
(2004) or Goodhart (2005).
5Figure 2: Cross Country HPS-statistic for HP-ltered data. The gure plots the HPS-
statistic for countries with a low statistic (high intervention) for dierent sample periods.
The data was ltered using the Hodrick-Prescott lter with parameter 40000. Panel (a) plots
the statistic computed for 1994-1998 (x-axis) against 1999-2003 (y-axis). Panel (b) plots the
statistic computed for 1999-2003 (x-axis) against 2004-2008 (y-axis). Panel (c) shows the
change from panel (a) to panel (b). The solid line depicts the 45-degree line. Countries close
to the line had a stable statistic.
not as strong, but still, one can nd a pattern.
We test the hypothesis that many developing countries assigned a strong prior to the
balance sheet model at the beginning of the sample and that they learned, towards the
2000's, that their fear was unfounded.
2 A Standard Small Open Economy Model
We use a standard new-keynesian small-open economy model as our workhorse since it is a
benchmark for Central Banks around the world. The exact structure here is close to Ball
(1999) and Gali and Monacelli (2005). The model of Gali and Monacelli (2005) begins
from proper micro-foundations that include monopolistic competition and nominal rigidities
which is the reason why nominal variables have real eects.
As in all New-Keynesian models, we have a Phillips curve:
t = Et [t+1] + 
yt + ";t (1)
where t is the in
ation rate, yt is the output gap and  is the period discount factor.
In
ation also depend depends on the expectation of in
ation Et [t+1] of the following periods
6in
ation and the output gap yt
6. ";t. The term ";t represents a cost-push shock.
In addition, there is an aggregate demand equation:
yt = Et [yt+1]   (it   Et [t+1]   r
n
t ) + Et [4st+1] + "y;t (2)
Equation 2 is the aggregate demand equation that describes how the output gap depends
on it's own one period ahead expectation term, the gap between the real interest rate and
its natural level rn
t , the expected nominal depreciation Et [4st+1] and a demand shock "y;t.
The textbook model will have  to be positive. Therefore, nominal devaluations will expand
output. The balance sheet model works the opposite way with  being negative. The nominal
interest rate it is controlled by the Central Bank so we will refer to it as its policy instrument.
The expected nominal exchange rate depreciation Etst+1 st is obtained via an uncovered
interest rate parity equation:
Et [4st+1] = it   i

t   "et (3)
This is a non-arbitrage condition between domestic it and foreign interest rates i
t. We
call the shock to this equation a nancial shock "e;t.
The natural interest rate rn









t is a shock to this autoregressive process. The system is characterized by the
following set of parameters which are constant over time: [, 
, , , fs;s;2
sgs=;y;e;i;r].
Notice that the model does not include terms of trade as other new-keynesian model do.
In fact, Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) have shown that at least for Australia, Canada, New
Zealand and the UK, the terms of trade in the model of Gali and Monacelli (2005) are not
important for the business cycle. Hence, one can be comfortable that this simplication will
not alter the results.
The model is very similar to its closed economy counterpart as suggested by Clarida et
al. (2001). Following Clarida et al. (2002), the Central Bank will seek to minimize a
standard quadratic loss function7:
6Notice that the small Open Economy Phillips Curve presented here ignore the Pass-Through mechanism.
This mechanism would not add much to a discussion on whether the textbook eect or the balance sheet
eect dominates.
7This loss function is analogous to the Closed Economy Version of this model. Recent papers have
provided microfoundations of a welfare function in the Small Open Economy that dier from this one. Faia
and Monacelli (2008) show that home bias in consumption is a sucient condition for introducing the
exchange rate into the objective. De Paoli (2009) also argues that the exchange rates should be included













The minimization is constrained by a set of equations 1, 2, 3 and 4 described above. In the
new Keynesian framework, Central Banks are concerned about stabilizing output because it
puts pressure on in
ation and because deviations from its steady state are inecient when
the market is not competitive and there are nominal frictions.
The timing protocol of the models is as follows: all shock processes "s;t for s = ;y;e;i;r;
follow an AR(1) process with corresponding set of parameters fs;s;2
sg. We denote the
innovations to these processes by s;t correspondingly. We further assume that all the "s;t
innovations are observed only after one period lag except for the "et risk premium shock that
aects the depreciation expectations and the world interest rate shock "i;t. This assumption
is supported by the fact that spot exchange rates are observed as well as nominal domestic
and world interest rates are observed immediately.
Under this protocol, optimal policies with certainty will be the limit cases of the Bayesian
policies we describe below. We can obtain the optimal policy discretionary policy (without
commitment) as a function of parameters and observed shocks. In the rest of the paper,
we focus on the optimal discretionary as opposed to commitment policies. Credible policies
under commitment for a Central Bank remains an unresolved question in economics. The
optimal policy, steady state equilibrium and other properties are described in appendix A.
3 Optimal Bayesian Policy
A Bayesian Central Bank that ignores whether data is generated by model A or B, will act
in accordance to a model prior probability assigned to each and maximize expected utility.
In dynamic setups, the Central Banker may incorporate the fact that his policies will aect
his ability to learn. Here, Central Banks are assumed to be myopic, in the sense that they
won't take into account the eect that their actions will have on their ability to learn. 8.
Active learning wouldn't aect the results since as we will show, learning would have been
too fast even without experimentation.
8In a related paper, Bigio and Vega (2006), study wether intentional policy experimentation could be
benecial. In their model, the balance sheet eects has a quadratic eect on output. In spite of this non-
linearity, no substantial gains from intentional policy experimentation are found. This is a result in line with
the one obtained by Cogley et al. (2007) and Cogley et al. (2008). We keep the focus of the discussion
here to passive learning policies. In contrast Wieland (2000a) and Wieland (2000b) shows that intentional
policy experimentation is benecial and may avoid policy traps
83.1 Knowledge Assumptions
The only particular feature about knowledge assumption is to assume that  has an unknown
value to both policy makers and agents within the model. Recall that  is the parameter
that translates exchange rate depreciations to an eect in the output gap. In addition we
adopt the common prior assumption. By doing so, uncertainty becomes common knowledge
and does not require solving the problem of `forecasting the forecast of others'9. A theorem
in Aumann (1979) asserts that under this assumption, posteriors coincide too.
3.2 The Bayesian Central Bank's Problem
When Central Bankers are uncertain about which of the two possible is the actual model
driving the economy they assign a probability pt to model A and a probability (1   pt) to
model B. This probability evolves according to the odds ratio, i.e, a combination of model
t and their shocks and an initial prior belief p0.
Note that the uncertainty is constrained to only two values of parameters. In fact, we
could have chosen to model this source of uncertainty as a density over the values of . In
fact the optimal policy in the case of 2 parameter values is the same optimal policy for
a continuum of parameters if we choose an appropriate prior density (though using Bayes
rules as an updating rule could change these relation after one period). The advantage of
restricting the parameter space is that each parameter has the interpretation of a dierent
model: the textbook and the balance sheet model. In further sections, this point will be
more clear.
By only taking into account this simple version of uncertainty the expected loss function
for period t becomes
L(p) = pLjA + (1   p)LjB (6)
Where LjA and LjB represent the value functions conditional on model A or B being
the true models. Note that because in the passive learning environment the priors are xed,
the prior can be taken as a parameter. To avoid notation, model A will refer to the textbook
model and model B to the balance sheet model. The loss function 6 is consistent with
expected utility theory. The optimal policy will be a function of the prior belief and current
available information. The following proposition describes this optimal policy:
Proposition 1 (Optimal Bayesian Policy). The optimal Bayesian monetary policy without
9Ellison (2006) makes the same assumption for the same reason.



















	(p) =   
 
pt







t   "et + "y;t:
The detail of the solution to the Central Bank's problem is presented in the appendix.
The optimal policy reacts to all of the shocks to the model by weighting there eects
into the loss function. The reaction to shocks depends on the sign of 	(p), which in turn,
depends on the prior. In fact the sign of the policy reaction may even change depending
on the prior (the next section provides detail for a particular calibration). Also note that
because the optimal policy depends on expectations of shocks that are not observable, the
set of state variables to compute the optimal policy includes all the shocks to the system
while including two demand shocks: one for each model. Hence, computing optimal policies
requires computing the demand shocks for both models.














P (DatajMB)P (MB) + P (DatajMA)P (MA)
(7)
The intuition behind this ratio is that the probability that the policy maker will assign
to a given model for being true will depend on a weighted average (with weights given by
the previous periods model probabilities) of the likelihood of the data at period t conditional
to each model and the data. In section 5 we describe how the priors converge to the true
model, i.e., the how Central Banks learn.
By holding priors xed we can understand some things about the learning dynamics of
this policy. We can observe that the smaller the variance of expected devaluation, Et [4st+1],
the smaller will be the dierence between the implied residuals of equation 2 according to
Models A and B. Thus the likelihood ratio will be close so the prior will evolve slower. When
the balance sheet eect is severe, the variance of expected devaluation will be smaller when
the prior pt is closer to 0 because the balance sheet model will suggest stronger stabilization
of the nancial shock. This is feature is consistent for the fear of 
oating economies Calvo
and Reinhart (2002).
No matter what the prior is, it can be shown that under this policy, Pt converges almost
10surely to the true model. Kasa (1999) provides a formal treatment on conditions for these
result. Intuitively, the fact that agent's will always learn the true model in this context
occurs because xed exchange rates are never optimal in this setup. Because this is the case,
on average the true model will yield a lower error term in the aggregate demand equation,
making it's likelihood function higher. This property comes from the fact that uncertainty
is described over a single parameter. In general, with uncertainty over more parameters,
this assertion is not necessarily true. Therefore, the focus of our description is on the speed
of learning rather than conditions that ensure learning at all. The next section describes
benchmark calibration of the model and its main features.
3.3 Calibration and Dynamics
Our calibration is designed so that the textbook model and the balance sheet model indicate
the policy maker react to nancial shocks in opposite directions. This property stressed by
the earlier studies on the balance sheet model, Aghion et al. (2000). The Bayesian optimal
policy is a convex combination of both policies. We illustrate the model's dynamics implies
by dierent priors. In particular, we want to stress how asymmetric are responses according
to the prior because this will have important consequences on learning. In this exercise we
x prior the prior in order to have a clear idea on what is the expected behavior of Central
Banks after a shock to the uncovered interest rate parity (or exchange rate shock)10.
We calibrate the model according to the following approach: we take the parameters in
equations 2, 1 and 3 according to the estimation done by Lubik and Schorfheide (2007)
for the Canadian economy. The parameters that determine the structure of the shock are
chosen to mimic the Bank of Canada's Quarterly Projection Model described in Murchison
and Rennison (2006). We chose Canada as our benchmark small open economy for model
A because it represents a small open economy that has developed nancially in such a way
that the balance sheet is not present. On the other hand, the HPS-statistic for Canada was
not as high as Australia or New Zealand, but the close enough to countries that seam to
suer from fear of 
oating at the beginning of the sample but not at the end. We calibrated
A and the variance of the process to match the HPS-statistic of Canada, and the volatility
of devaluations and interest rates. To parameterize model B, we chose A to match the HPS-
statistic of Peru, an example of a fear of 
oating economy11. The summary is presented in
table 1:
10Other Impulses responses are available in the authors webpage. We left the interpretation for the reader.
All the impulse responses are centralized in codes available in the author's webpage.
11Our model is a simplication of any of the models describe. We interpreted variables and tried to
replicate the model's impulse responses as close as possible.
11Parameter Value Notes
Reduced form parameters
 0.99 Specifying a quarterly model with 4 per cent steady-state real interest rate

 0.86 Following Lubik and Schorfheide (2007)
 0.37 Following Lubik and Schorfheide (2007)
w 0.5 Putting 2/3 of wheight on in
ation and 1/3 on output
Shock process parameters
 0.7 Guided by Bank of Canada's Quarterly Projection Model12 Price Mark-Up Shock
y 0.2 Guided by Bank of Canada's Quarterly Projection Model Demand Shock
r 0.3 Following Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) estimate of terms of trade estimate
i 0.8 Consistent with Libor data
e 0.35 Guided by Bank of Canada's Quarterly Projection Model Risk Premium (Exchange Rate) Shock
 0.15 Guided by Bank of Canada's Quarterly Projection Model Price Mark-Up Shock
y 0.18 To match volatility of interst rates and devaluations in Canda
r 0.5 Following Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) estimate of terms of trade estimate
i 0.25 Consistent with Libor data
e 0.08 To match volatility of interst rates and devaluations in Canda
Model A and B
A 0.1 To match Canada's HPS-statistic
B -0.6 To match Peru's HPS-statistic
(8)
Under this parameterizations we can have a good idea of the exchange rate policy behind
the optimal policy by observing the impulse responses functions shown in gures 3 and 4.
The impulse we analyze is a negative nancial shock (exchange rate shock). A negative
shock of this type will put pressure towards appreciation. The plots show a continuum of
impulse responses for each prior. The darkest lines indicate the behavior when the Central
Bank was closer to certainty, that is, when the prior was either close to 1 or close to 0. As
the lines get lighter, this means that the prior was of more uncertainty about either model.
Arrows in the gure point out the outcome under the optimal policy for each model (a
prior of 1 or 0). One can see in both gures that if the Policy Maker knows the true model
he is able to stabilize both output and in
ation perfectly. Under model A the optimal policy
makes the Central Bank reduce interest rates. It does so because interest rates will have
two eects that oset each other exactly stabilizing the output gap. On the one hand, a
reduction in the interest rates provokes a further appreciation according to the uncovered
parity (equation 3). Because under model A, the aggregate demand (equation 2) reacts
negatively to the appreciation but positively to the reduction in interest rates, the policy is
designed in such a way that both eects exactly oset each other.
Under model B, the eects appreciations work the opposite way. Appreciations cause
output to expand, but the belief that output will contract prescribes to lower rates. This
pushes the depreciation even further on and deviations are even stronger.
Under certainty, there is no tension between stabilizing output and in
ation because the
model lacks a pass-through rate. A 0 pass-through rate is unlikely in an open economy
but for many countries pass-through rates are usually not high13. Our assumption implies
13Lubik and Schorfheide (2007) shows that it is low for industrialized economies. Monacelli (2005) studies
12that the costs of nominal devaluations are due to model uncertainty rather than a sacrice
ratio trade-o caused by pass-through. This will matter when we calculate Robust policies
because distorted probabilities will only respond to uncertainty and will not try be respond
to this trade-o.
When the Central Banks assigns a positive prior to both models, the policies are the
same during the rst period after the shock is realized. In subsequent periods, the policies
are dierent because the Central Bank will belief that there was a demand shock for the
false model. Because it assigns a non-zero prior to that model, and the shock has serial
correlation, in subsequent periods, the policy is reacting partially to an expected shock in
aggregated demand too. The wrong model is predicting subsequent demand shocks.
The cost of missing the true model manifests itself through in through deviations from
the steady state in
ation and output (upper right and lower left panel). Under model A, the
textbook model, a Central Bank assigning a low prior will increase interest rats inducing a
fall on output and a de
ation. Fear of a 
oating induces the wrong policy prescription.
When the true model is model B, the balance sheet model, and the prior assigned to this
model is low, the Central Banks acts by reducing rates, thus causing an output expansion
and an undesired in
ation.
One additional feature of missing the correct prior is that interest rates show an acceler-
ation eect: the peak increase (decrease) in rates is not immediately after the shock occur.
Rather, when beliefs are far from truth, after the shock is realized, the Central Bank puts
a high prior on the event that the economy was also hit by a demand shock. The Central
Bank estimates shock according to the wrong model and nds it was positive when in fact it
did not exist. Because shocks have memory, in subsequent periods it reacts to the exchange
rate shock and a demand shock that never happened. This phenomenon translates into
the hump-shape of impulse responses when the prior is wrong. In the lines of Chari et.al
(2002), this property of the model adds additional persistence of real exchange rates through
monetary policy reactions.
Because losses are weighted dierently depending on the model, we observe that the
Bayesian policy is asymmetric. For a prior of 0.5, the reaction after the shock is closer to the
reaction under the balance sheet model because outcomes are much worse under this model.
This condition will have eects over Robust policies.
The dierences of the optimal policy under each model will aect the HPS-statistic.
Figure 5 shows the expected statistic for dierent priors for both models. The when a high
prior is assigned to the balance sheet model, the gure shows that the statistic is much
smaller. This image is consistent with the fear of 
oating literature. The gure also shows
optimal policies in low pass-through environments.
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Outcome  − Model A
Outcome  − Model B Outcome  − Model B
Outcome  − Model B
Optimal Policy − Model A
Optimal Policy − Model B
Figure 3: Bayesian Impulse Response - True Model A: The gure shows the reaction of al
the endogenous variables after a positive Financial Shock. This shocks puts pressure towards
devaluation. Darker colors re
ect priors closer to certainty. The lighter color is put on the
prior with 0.5 probability.












































Optimal Policy − Model A
Outcome −Model B
Outcome − Model A
Outcome −Model B
Outcome − Model A
Outcome −Model B
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Optimal Policy − Model B
Figure 4: Bayesian Impulse Response - True Model B: The gure shows the reaction of al
the endogenous variables after a positive Financial Shock. This shocks puts pressure towards
devaluation. Darker colors re
ect priors closer to certainty. The lighter color is put on the
prior with 0.5 probability.














Figure 5: HPS-statistic implied by model
an additional perverse consequence of the balance sheet model. Volatility is extremely high
when the balance sheet eect is disregarded. When we solve for Robust policies, this feature
will have important eects on how the Central Bank will distort his priors. The gures also
include the statistic for Canada and Peru. The arrows show the direction of the increase of
the statistic from the rst sub-sample to the last sub-sample. Though the statistic is itself a
random variable, the gure is consistent with the argument that an increase in the statistic
would show signs of learning about model A. Peru could have faced more shocks in the last
sample, but a potential alternative story is that it has slowly started to discover that the
textbook model applies to its economy.
164 Robust Policy
In section 3 we described how learning about the eects of exchange rate depreciations may
occur in less decade when the Central Bank is Bayesian under our calibration. In this section,
we assume that the Central Bank has a fear of misspecication of his prior probabilities and
hence, optimizes not in accordance to multiplier preferences instead of expected utility theory.
Hansen and Sargent (2006) and Hansen and Sargent (2007b) provide substantial support
to use these preferences as a modeling device that summarizes fear of misspecication. The
idea here is that Central Banks can fear that their updating rules are misspecied. They
does not fully trust Bayes rule. There are two reasons that may suggest that Central Bankers
in countries that face a potential balance sheet eect may be particularly concerned about
misspecication. The rst reason is that in spite of observing aggregate data, central bankers
constantly may receive information from the private sector. Microeconomic evidence on the
balance position of rms with foreign lenders and the banking system may be inconsistent
with aggregate eects but the Central Bank does not know how to incorporate this evidence.
On the other hand, interest groups may have incentives to complain about strong exchange
rate movements. Finally, perceived nancial fragility from balance sheet's solely, may neglect
the fact that rms can renegotiate their loans to imply the same real burden as before. In
fact, rms may be covered against unforseen exchange rate movements in several ways that
include forward-back operations. Coverage mechanisms may be hard to observe by central
banks.
The second reason is purely statistical: Bayes rule requires additional knowledge. It
requires Central Banks to put a priori knowledge on the distribution of economic shocks.
Even if shocks are believed to be Gaussian, central bankers are required to know the true
variance in advance.
By using Robust policies, the Central Bank will use Bayes rule as a pivotal mechanism to
asses risks, but will minimize loss for a set of priors close to the one computed by the data and
Bayes rule. Hansen and Sargent's framework deals with two sources of misspecication14.
Robust preferences are characterized by a single parameter, 15. The higher this param-
eter is, the more will the central Bank trust it's prior. The robust policy maker solves the
following problem:
14For example, in Cogley et al. (2008) two operators are dened to deal with both forms of fear of
misspecication. In this paper, we concentrate only on the later of this. The following problem is close to
what they dene as their T2-operator only case.
15To avoid confusion, this parameters is  in Hansen and Sargent's notation. Here  refers to the exchange
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Here p is the same prior probability as in the problem dened in section 3. The Central
Banker acts as if there exists a malevolent agent that attempts to distort the prior prob-
abilities assigned to each of the models. This articial agent is not entirely free to choose
any value, but is constrained by a multiplier,  in this case, that summarizes the Central
Banker's fear of missespecication. Without this restriction, the articial evil agent would
choose the balance sheet model always for the reasons discussed in the previous section.
Hence, higher values of  allows the evil agent lower distortions to the prior,  = inf allows
no distortions at all. A Central Bank with strong concerns about Robustness will set  very
low, and the evil agent will distort probabilities accordingly.
The game represented by 9 is played simultaneously. The minimizing agent will therefore
take a sequences fitg of policy decisions as given and minimize the Welfare function. The
rst order and sucient condition for the articial minimizing agent is:

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+  = 0
so regrouping and clearing out this equation yields:

 p













This equality says that if the loss originated from model A is bigger than the loss caused
by model B, the Central Banker will act according to  p > p: Note that for at least some
value of the preference parameter, there is well dened mapping from p to  p: Once we obtain
 p the problem for the Robust Central Bank is the same as in section 4. This condition is
also used in Cogley et al. (2008)16. The main distinction here is that the Phillips curve and
output gap equations depend on the agent's expectations. Dealing with Robust in contexts
in which there agent beliefs aect the law of motion of variables has not yet been dealt in
the in the literature. In the next subsections I describe an assumption that simplies this
complication and allows to compute the value function for each model for a given prior.
16In particular in these preferences are consistent with ?? setting 1 = 1 and 2 = .
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Figure 6: Distorted Prior from Robust Policy and Bayesian Prior. After a devaluation shock
of 1 standard deviation.
4.1 Knowledge Assumptions and Optimal Policy
We maintain the assumptions of proposed in section 3. In addition we assume that expecta-
tions of agents in equations 2 - 3 are constructed in such a way that they are based upon the
same prior model belief that assigns the same distorted probability  p to the Central Bank
does. This assumption indirectly suggests that when agents derive there optimal pricing
strategies that give rise to the Phillips curve, they do so in such a way that the distorted
probabilities are identical to the Central Bank.
194.2 Distorted Probabilities and Policies
Robust policies will depend on a distorted probability calculated from 10. Once this proba-
bilities are computed 17 the optimal robust policy replaces the prior in 23 for the distorted
prior. The state space has multiple dimensions. Therefore, in this section we describe the
distortions of probabilities for a given nancial shock as an example. Nevertheless, it is clear
that other realizations of shocks will generate dierent distortions.
The value functions conditional on the true model depend on the current shock realiza-
tion. Because for some priors, distinct realizations of shocks may induce a worse outcome
from one model or the other, it will be the case that Robust policies may tilt the prior to-
wards one model and tilt it towards another model for a dierent realization. Figure 6 plots,
on the vertical axis plots the distortion over the prior over model A for each value of the
prior over model A in the horizontal axis. The shock is 1 standard deviation devaluation of
the exchange rate. All alternative shocks are set to 0 in this exercise to stress the eects on
the exchange rate. Each curve around the 45-degree lines show distortions under dierent
values of .
The gure shows that when model A is the true model, upon a devaluation, the Robust
central banker will react as if its Bayesian prior were closer to model B. This implies an
interest policy that reacts with more strength to exchange rate devaluations. From the
analysis carried out in the previous sections we could interpret the points in which the
distorted probabilities tilt the prior towards model B, as points in which learning will occur
at a slower pace. Nevertheless, Robustness will work in the opposite direction for a shock
of the opposite sign. Thus, it is clear that the eect of fear of misspecication will aect
learning depending on the nature of the shock and its sign. The eect of Robust policies will
be described in the following section when we present some simulations based on Bayesian
and Robust policies.
The reason for this ambiguity is hinted by Hansen, Sargent and Tallarini (1999) and
Adam (2004). In the latter paper, it is shown that for concerns about the nature of the
shocks aecting the economy, for well dened robust preferences, there is equivalent Bayesian
problem. In our framework, the nature of Robustness diers. It only operates over the prior
and not over the perceived law of motion for the shocks. Nevertheless, the distorted prior,
by shifting the weight from one model to the other seems operate in an analogous way to a
change in the distribution of the shocks. The dierence thus, between robustness concerns
over the priors are a more restrictive concern than over the shocks nature. For the set of
models they analyze These authors nd that the optimal robust policy will have an equivalent
17See Appendix C for the numerical algorithm.
20optimal Bayesian problem if the risk aversion parameter is perturbed. Because our model
has the property that the model that yields a worst outcomes depends on the shock, this
seems to suggest that robustness will not tilt the prior consistently towards one model or
the other. This then suggests that learning under robust policies should not be dramatically
dierent from the Bayesian counterpart. We explore this in the next section.
5 Model Dynamics and Learning
5.1 Learning Under Bayesian Policies
For the calibration described in table 1. Figure 7 explains the speed of convergence of the
prior probability departing from initial values for the prior and the model. Solid lines report
the expected18 path for priors depending on the correct model: model A (solid) and model
B (dashed). The horizontal axis of the graph we have the time elapsed where the scale is
quarters. The vertical axis measures the value of the prior so that the curves represent the
mean of the prior model evolution.
When the true model is A, we nd that beginning from a prior of 10 per cent the
expected waited time for converging to a prior probability of 90 per cent is slightly above
5 years, roughly, the time interval of each of our cross-country sub-samples. The learning
process is very similar independently of the model. The dashed and solid lines are very close
to each other.
The conclusion from this graphs is that following a strictly optimal Bayesian policy, the
Central Bank needs about from 4 to 5 years to detect the true model when the economy is
initiated with a the wrong prior. In spite of being a long time, this 4 to 5 years seems faster
than what we observe in the data. If the textbook eect had been the true structure of the
economy, we would have expected to see the systematic increase in volatility at the panel (a)
of gure 1 not in panel (b). In the next section we ask if concerns for model misspecication
can explain the pattern.
5.2 Learning Under Robust Policies
Figure 8 describes the speed of convergence to the true model by replicating 7 when Robust
policies are implemented. The gures are based on a value of  = 219We could have chosen
a tighter parameter but results did not change much for small perturbations. Moreover
18Expectations approximated by 20000 replications. The simulations are initiated with a shock to the
exchange rate and the other shocks set to 0.
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Figure 7: Prior Evolution for Bayesian Policy: Solid lines show the evolution of priors towards
Model A when Model A is the true model. Dashed lines show the evolution of priors towards
Model B when Model B is the true model. Simulations are carried out considering Bayesian
policies based on updated priors.












Figure 8: Prior Evolution for Robust Policy: Solid lines show the evolution of priors towards
Model A when Model A is the true model. Dashed lines show the evolution of priors towards
Model B when Model B is the true model. Simulations are carried out considering Robust
policies based on updated priors.
concerns for Robustness cannot be taken much further. The problem becomes ill-posed for
values of  = 0:8). The main conclusion that we obtain from the graph is that learning is not
modied substantially as expected. That is, the result is consistent with the conjecture that
this is due to the fact that Robustness works as a change in risk aversion. If this is the case,
because outcomes are worst in one model depending on the realization of shocks, robustness
wouldn't tilt the prior systematically towards either model modifying the propensity to
learn. A detail inspection though, suggests that learning seems to occur faster, under Robust
policies.
235.3 Learning with Time Varying Parameters and Cross Country
Correlations
The previous sections show that neither Bayesian optimal or robust policies could ac-
count for a learning pattern slow enough to explain international towards more 
exible
exchange rates. In this section we test an alternative. Here we assume that  evolves
according to a 2-state Markov process. In particular, we calibrate the model such that
Prft+1 = Ajt = Ag = 0:99 and Prft+1 = Bjt = Bg = 0:99, so that the process is
highly autocorrelated. This information is common knowledge and the priors are updated
accordingly to this process. The Markovian structure followed by this process is aimed to
capture the fact that international events, could the structure to switch from one to the other.
We have in mind episodes in which after nancial crises, international nancial institutions
begin to ask borrowers in developing countries to purchase costly insurance mechanisms
against exchange rate movements, thus preventing the balance sheet to dominate. The re-
verse could happen once when the position of international nancial markets strengthens,
and developing country lenders are no longer asked to hedge.
With this intuition in mind, Figure 9 shows the expected behavior of the prior when it
is started at 0.1, and the Markov process for  is such that  = B for 30 periods and it
rapidly switches to  = A. When this is the case, the model can indeed account for the rapid
change towards more 
exible exchange rates (the prior moves quickly towards the textbook
model). This gure shows that if for many countries, there was a structural change during
some point in the early 2000's, the model could easily account for the movement away from
fear of 
oating.
Figure 10 shows a replica of Panel C in 2. A replica of 41 simulated countries for the
same sample size experiencing a parameter change from the balance sheet model to the
textbook model at the middle of the sample. The gure shows again the pattern away from
the 45-degree line. This shows that the trend towards more 
exible exchange rates observed
in the data, could be explained by the model if there was a parameter change during the
early 2000's.
It remains unclear what type of structural change could aect developing countries al-
together. It is likely though, that the period after the currency crises induced market reg-
ulations on capital markets such that it forced parties to hedge against risks. On the other
hand, privately, agents participating on these markets may have adopted nancial contracts
that preventing either party from suering losses due to currency mismatches. This section
suggests that there could be an explanation of this sort behind a trend towards more 
exible
exchange rates.










Figure 9: Prior Evolution with a change from the Balance Sheet model to the Textbook
model in middle of sample.










Figure 10: Simulation of Cross Country Evidence: The model is subject to a parameter
change from the Balance Sheet model to the Textbook model in the early 2000's
266 Concluding Remarks
This paper was motivated by a conversation between the Chairman of a Central Bank in a
developing country and a member of his modeling unit:
-Econometrician: `If you don't let it variate you'll never learn what its impact is'
-Central Banker: `I don't want to learn'.
Indeed, this dialogue may have often occurred in various developing countries. Cross-
country data, on the other hand, seems to suggest that fear of 
oating was reduced in many
of them during recent years. We tested the hypothesis that by believing in the balance sheet
model, countries intervened substantially on their exchange rate markets and by this, they
lost the ability to learn if the balance sheet model was indeed relevant for a long time.
We tested this hypothesis under Bayesian and robust optimal policies. The calibration
suggests that the econometrician was wrong. Regardless of the fact that the exchange rate
variations relative to output variations were low, a Bayesian or robust Central Bank would
have discovered the true model in a shorter time than what the data seems to suggest.
On the other hand, the model shows that the trend towards more 
exible exchange rates
could be explained if the structure of this economies changed. In particular, if the balance
sheet structure of the economy was replaced by a classic textbook model. A parameter
change of this type occurring between 1999 and 2003 could reconcile the model with the
data. Behind the scenes, the nding suggests that the international currency crises of the
late nineties bolstered reforms that made economies less prone to suering from balance
sheet mismatches. Our results lead us to ask what economic factors could have caused a
systematic parameter change that has induced more 
exibility in the exchange rates?
Though we would like to understand what could have caused a systematic parameter
change, we are condent that, on their own, wrong beliefs cannot account for an international
trend towards more 
exible exchange rates.
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31A Optimal Discretionary Policy under Certainty
[For referee's ease.]
The behavior of private agents described by equations 1, 2 and 3 can be reduced to a
simple two-equation system by direct substitution. :
t = Et [t+1] + 
yt + ";t (11)
yt = Et [yt+1]   (   )it + Et [t+1] + y;t (12)
where we have replaced 3 into 2 and set y;t = rn
t   i
t   "et + "y;t:
We use the Phillips curve to solve the minimization problem and the IS equation to infer











t + t(t+1 + 
yt + ";t   t)
	
#
The discretionary solution implies that the following rst-order conditions with respect
to Et [t] and Et [yt] holds every period20:
2Et [t] = Et [t]
and
2wEt [yt] + 
Et [t] = 0





Et [t] = Et [yt] (13)
In order to implement this rule through the policy instrument it, we replace the above







Et [t] = E [t+1] + ";t 1 (14)
This equation can be solved by guessing a solution for the expectations operator Et [t] =
";t 1 where  is parameter to be determined. This guess in turn implies Et [t+1] =
20 Implicitly we are assuming the Central Bank controls expectations directly.
32";t 1. Substituting the guess back into the Phillips curve allows us to obtain the solution













fEt [yt+1]   Et [yt] + Et [t+1] + Et [y;t]g
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 1 + Et [y;t]
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(16)
This completes the proof of the optimal policy in the perfect certainty case.





which is a simple rule that attains zero in
ation by reacting to observed shock to the output
gap.
Giving the timing protocol, the solution to the expectation of exogenous shocks is:
Et[y;t] = (r"r;t 1)   "i;t   "e;t + y;t"y;t 1
where the expectation takes that form given the assumption that "et and "i;t are observable.
We then substitute this result 12 and obtain:








  1) + 

"; 1 + Et [t+1] + y;t   Et[y;t] (17)





"; 1 + y;t   Et[y;t]
This conrms our guess for the law of motion yt's expectation.





"; 1 + r;t + y;t (18)
33To determine the law of motion of in
ation from 11:

















y;t + p";t 1 + ;t
so synthesizing:






y;t + ;t (19)
The value of the exchange rate is obtained directly from the UIP equation 3:
Et [4st+1] = it   i

t   "et (20)
A.1 Steady State of the Economy
In absence of shocks we obtain from 16 the steady state value of the interest rate,  {, in terms
of the steady state of the stochastic process,  y;t, and in
ation,  t. The steady state for the
stochastic process is:







so from the steady state version of the Phillips curve and the gap condition we obtain:
0 =  (   ) { +   +  y
which in turn implies:  = 0:
The non-commitment policy yields the desired result of y = 0: Thus, in absence of shocks,
the policy induces the highest lowest cost possible.
34A.2 State-Space Representation
A.2.1 Exogenous State Block
The exogenous state vector-equation for this model is:
St = ASt 1 + Bwt
were explicitly it is expressed in matrix notation matching our paramors according to :
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Recall we adopt, by expositional motives, the convention that i
t = "i;t:
A.2.2 Observable State Equation
The observable vector-equation for this model is:
Zt = CSt + Dut
we use the following parameters auxiliaries to nd a parsimony representation.































and we have that:
it = F1";t 1 + F2"y;t 1 + F3"r;t 1 + F4"i;t + F5"e;t
Phillips Curve: Redening 19 we obtain that:
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and using the auxiliaries:
G1 = 1
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Nominal Depreciation and Final Matrix form We are looking for a system of the
sort:
Zt = CSt
To obtain this matrix equation we can write this by using 20 and noting that it can be
written as a function of the exogenous processes that aect the policy instrument and the
observable shocks that aect these equation directly. Summing up, the matrix form for the
set of observable should look like:
2












6 6 6 6
4
0 F1 0 F2 0 F3 F4 F5 0
G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 0 0 0
0 H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 0 0 0
0 F1 0 F2 0 F3 F4   1 F5   1 0
3
7 7 7 7
5
2
6 6 6 6 6
6 6 6 6 6 6
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37B Solution to the Passive Learning Policy without Com-
mitment under Uncertainty
This appendix describes the solution to the Central Bank's problem when he behaves as a
Bayesian optimizer.
B.1 Setting up the Lagrangian
We solve the central bank problem without commitment under model uncertainty following
similar procedures as we use for the case with model certainty. The main dierence corre-
sponds to the way in which agents agent's and the Central Bank form their expectations.
Hence, the objective is to solve for the following, prior-conditional Lagrangian:





yyt + "   t)jpt]
so the rst order conditions with respect to ftg1
t= and fytg1
t= is the same as in the case
with model certainty, except for the fact that expectations take the prior in consideration.
Recall from section 3 that agent expectations and the central bank's expectations on in
ation
regarding the prior are the same by assumption. This assumption allows us to regroup the
expectation operator of the Central Bank as well as the agents expectations present in the





Et [tjpt] = Et [ytjpt] (21)
We can apply the expectations operator conditional on the prior to the Phillips curve







Et(tjpt) = Et(t+1jpt) + ";t 1
The main complication here is how to deal with the conditional expectations E(+1jpt):
Again we take the guess of a linear functional in terms of the previous shocks. We use a
linear combination of both these shocks to make a guess:
E(tjpt) = 
BAY ";t 1
where BAY is the parameter yet to be determined.









this is the same result as the one obtained in the Perfect Certainty case. Thus, the
intuition behind this result is that the Central Banks goal is the same both, under certainty
and uncertainty and given what he knows he will try to maintain in
ation as if he knew
the true model. Consequently, regardless of the denition of expectations, the Central Bank
will try to set these expectations to the same number.The dierence will be in the action he
takes.
The law of motion for fE(tjpt)g1






Having sorted out what fE(t)g1
t= is we may obtain the corresponding expected path
for fE(yt)g1






We obtain the result for the optimal no-commitment policy by taking the Bayesian ex-






[E(y+1   yjpt) + E(+1jpt) + E(y;jpt)]
where 	(pt) =   
 
ptH + (1   pt)L


























which is a simple rule that reacts to only to the shocks that aect the output gap. Given
the data set available at ; E(y;jpt) may be easily computed by taking the weighted
average of the shocks that aect the model. Notice that "y;t 1 is not identied and depends
on the model as it is obtained as a residual to the output gap equation, which in the end
depends on the parameter on which we have uncertainty about.
39B.2 State Space Representation
B.2.1 Exogenous State Block
The exogenous state vector-equation for this model is:
St = A(pt)St 1 + Bwt (24)
were explicitly it is expressed in matrix notation matching our parameters according to :
2
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6 6 6 6
6 6 6 6 6
6 6 6 6 6 6
6 6 6 6 6 6
4
 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 y 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 r 0 0 0 rn 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 i 0 rn 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 e 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
J1 0 J2 0 J3 0 J4 J5 0 J6 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3
7 7 7
7 7 7 7 7 7
7 7 7 7 7 7




6 6 6 6 6 6
6 6 6 6 6 6


















7 7 7 7 7 7
7 7 7 7 7 7





6 6 6 6 6 6
6 6 6 6 6 6
6 6 6 6 6 6
6 6 6
4
 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 y 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 r 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 i 0
0 0 0 0 e
0 0 0 0 0
J7 0 0 J8 J9
0 0 0 0 0
3
7
7 7 7 7 7
7 7 7 7 7 7








Recall that as in the previous section, we adopt for expositional motives, the convention
that i
t = "i;t: As opposed to the system that we dened in the previous appendix. we have
introduced to extra columns. The columns refer to the residual of the false model that will
be an endogenous outcome of the model. Note that we have not yet solved for the unknowns
40fJsg
9
s=1 : To do so, we will use a result from the next section.
B.2.2 Endogenous State Block
Take the policy reaction function describe in equation 23 and our guess for the formation
of expectations and replace this results correspondingly in the equation 12 for each of the
models. Assume that T is the true value and F the false value. We will obtain that the



























it + ~ y;t
The ~ term in the variables of this equation are the outcomes of under the false model.
For the same observation yt; each model implies a dierent innovation. To obtain the false
model's output gap residual as a function of the innovations to the true model we subtract






it   ~ y;t = 0






it = ~ "y;t
which in turn implies that:





it = y~ "y;t 1 + ~ vy;t (25)
Recall that "y;t 1 and ~ "y;t 1 are state variables for the Central Bank. Then, ~ vy;t is an
endogenous outcome of the model. To obtain an explicit solution to the we rely obtain a
linear form of the Central Bank's Policy as a function of the innovations to the system.






























































and we have that:
it = F1";t 1 + F2"y;t 1 + F3"r;t 1 + F4"i;t + F5"e;t + F6~ "y;t 1
Replacing this result in 25 allows us to compute the value of the fJsg
5
s=1 since we can regroup
this terms to obtain the value of ~ vy;t and simply add the to the corresponding row of the
evolution of the exogenous matrixes. We obtain the following result:





















































Therefore we summarize this equation by:
~ "y;t = J1";t 1 + J2"y;t 1 + J3"r;t 1 + J4"i;t 1 + J5"e;t 1 + J6~ "y;t 1 + J7vy;t + J8i;t + J8e;t



















































Not that because the terms "r;t 1 and "i;t 1 don't have a zero mean, a priori we can
expect the wrong model to have a bias (unless T = F are trivially equal) whichever that
is.
In
ation Equation We can use equation 19 proceed in the same manner as in Appendix
(A) so the set fGsgs=;y;r;i;e remains the same.














t   "et + "y;t














H2 (pt) = 1





H4 (pt) = 






















43Nominal Depreciation and Matrix form Nominal Depreciations equation remains the
same. Therefore, the system that summarize the economy takes the form:
Zt = C (pt)St (26)
where the dierence in relation to the result in (A) is the appearance of parameter pt:


















0 F1 0 F2 0 F3 F4 F5 0 0 F6
G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 0 0 0 0 0
0 H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 H7 0 0 H8
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B.3 Conditional Moments and Loss Functions
Unconditional moments may be obtained via numerical simulations of the system above
described. On the contrary, we can use the matrix forms in the above section here to obtain
an analytical expression though not in close form solution. The system is summarized by to
blocks of linear equations and a single non-linear equation computed
St = A(pt)St 1 + Bwt
Zt = C (pt)St





ptP (DatatjDatat 1;MA) + (1   pt)P (DatatjDatat 1;MB)
Cogley et al. (2005) have shown that pt+1 is a martingale. Conditional on the true model,
we showed that pt+1 is either a supermartingale or sub-martingale depending on which is the
true model. We use this facts in the following section.
44B.3.1 Moments Conditional on the True Model and State
First Moments Conditional expectations over the exogenous states are:
Et[St+1jSt;pt+1] = A(pt+1)St
Substituting thin into the observable yields:
Et[Zt+1jSt;pt+1] = C (pt+1)[A(pt+1)]St
where for simplicity we dened:
M (pt+1) = C (pt+1)[A(pt+1)]
Second Moments Recall the following equivalence:
St+1 = A(pt+1)St + Bwt+1
and therefore:
Zt+1 = C (pt+1)[A(pt+1)St + Bwt+1]










0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 w 0





We can substitute in the components of Zt+1 to obtain:
[A(pt+1)St + Bwt+1]
0 C (pt+1)
0 WC (pt+1)[A(pt+1)St + Bwt+1]
Taking expectations over the above equation and dening it as a value V we obtain:
V (St;pt+1) = S
0
tM (pt+1)










45where we used the fact that wt+1 are i.i.d shocks to eliminate the cross terms. Note that the
pt+2 here will depend on the outcome of w
0
t+1 and the true model.
B.3.2 Value Conditional on True Model
Here we use pt+1 to refer to the probability of the event that A is the true model. The value
of the Central Bank's problem conditional on the event that the true model is A is given by:
LtjA (St;pt+1) = V (St;pt+1jA)+E

(pt+1)Lt+1jA (St+1;pt+2) + (1   pt+1)Lt+1jB (St+1;pt+2)jA

and
LtjB (St;pt+1) = V (St;pt+1jB)+E

(pt+1)Lt+1jA (St+1;pt+2) + (1   pt+1)Lt+1jB (St+1;pt+2)jB

Both value functions can be obtained via standard methods of computation of value
functions.
46C Approximation of Robust Policies - Value Function
Method
In appendix B we have showed how to compute L pj;A and L pjB: In this section we explain
the numerical procedure to compute L pj;A-L pjB:
The procedure for the numerical solution of this problem is:
Algorithm
1. First, discretize the exogenous state space using Tauchen's method. The relevant space
is: S = f";t 1;"y;t 1;rn
t 1;i
t 1;"e;t 1; ~ "y;t 1g:
2. We model prior space according to Chebyschev nodes.
3. Use an initial guess for the two Value Functions indexed by their corresponding model
priors: LtjA (;) and LtjB (;).
4. Dene a closed loop to satisfy a convergence condition for the guess in LtjA (;) and
LtjB (;).
5. Dene an Inner Loop over all model prior probabilities and exogenous state sock grids.
6. Dene and Open Loop for draws in wt+1, using 1000 draws:









t+1 to update p(t + 2) given p(t + 1);
for model A and Model B.and the point in state S:
9. Update the point S; and use update points in [0;1]S and evaluate them at LtjA (;)
and LtjB (;) using an interpolation method. Save the outcome.
10. Compute the mean of the outcomes in 8 9; and use these to update the guess values
in the grid space for LtjA (St;pt+1)  LtjB (St;pt+1).
11. Repeat 5-10 until convergence.
Once the value functions are computed, we use them to compute a solution to 10.
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